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LABOR LAW-INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS-EXTENSION OF THE 
RIGHT OF CONTROL TEST-Petitioner, a large independent oil company, 
owned a gasoline service station which it leased to an individual operator, 
reserving the right to determine certain aspects of the lessee's operations.1 
During the lease period, a majority of the station attendants signed 
union authorization cards, and the union requested a meeting with the 
lessee for the purpose of negotiating a contract. The lessee refused to 
negotiate, discharged the attendants, and hired replacements. The trial 
examiner found that petitioner, as an employer of his lessee, had violated 
section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to 
bargain.2 On appeal, held, affirmed. Under the "right of control" test, the 
petitioner is an employer of the lessee; as the employer, petitioner is 
responsible for the unfair labor practice of his employee and therefore 
must rehire the station attendants3 and pay their back wages. Site Oil Co., 
137 N.L.R.B. 1274 (1962). 
Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act contained no compre-
hensive definition of "employee."4 The Taft-Hartley Act, however, included 
an amendment to section 2(3) which excluded independent contractors 
from the category of employees.5 This attempt to narrow the employee 
concept6 reversed the judicial trend evidenced by NLRB v. Hearst Publi-
cations, Inc.7 In that case, the Supreme Court, in holding newspaper 
vendors to be employees, refused to apply the old common-law distinction 
between independent contractors and employees because it felt the policy 
behind the statute required a broader test. The House report on the Taft-
Hartley Act, on the other hand, specified that the terms independent 
contractor and employee were to be given their ordinary legal meanings, 
and not the broad definitions of the Hearst case.8 Further, the House 
report indicated that the essential difference between an employee and 
an independent contractor was that the former worked for wages, whereas 
the latter was compensated by profits.9 The NLRB, instead of adopting 
this quite narrow approach, has applied, in every subsequent case, the 
1 The lease was terminable on thirty days notice by either party; it required the lessee 
to make a substantial payment to obtain the lease, gave the lessee the right to hire and 
discharge the attendants and set their wages, required the lessee to obtain approval 
to sell any items other than the oil company's products, and provided that all gas 
and oil would be delivered on a consignment basis and would be sold at a price set 
by the oil company. 
2 NLRA § 8(a)(5), as amended, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1958). 
s The station had burned to the ground after the discharge of the original attend-
ants and the petitioner was required to rehire them only if it decided to rebuild the 
station. 
4 NLRA § 2(3), 49 Stat. 450 (1935). 
IS LMRA § IOI, 61 Stat. 137-38 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1958). 
o See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947). 
7 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
8 H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 6, at 18. 
D Ibid. 
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somewhat broader "right of control" test.10 This test focuses on whether 
the person for whom the services are being performed has control over 
the manner and means by which the result is to be accomplished.11 If 
the former has such control, the person performing the services is an 
employee. On the other hand, if the person for whom the services are 
being performed specifies only the result to be accomplished and has no 
substantial control over the method used to achieve it, the person hired is 
an independent contractor within the meaning of the statute. The decisions 
have recognized that the basic question as to whether the amount of 
control retained is sufficient to make the relationship one of employment 
is to be determined from the facts of each case, with no one factor being 
determinative.12 Nevertheless, the courts have announced several factors 
which are significant indications of the type of relationship involved in 
a given case.13 Among the more important factors are whether the alleged 
employee (I) has the right to hire and discharge the people actually 
doing the work; (2) has control of the premises where the work is being 
done; (3) furnishes the tools and materials; and (4) stands to make a profit 
from those working under him.14 
While the principal case purports to apply this same "right of control" 
test to determine the relationship between the petitioner and its lessee,15 
it seems the Board may have extended the scope of the test beyond its 
traditional bounds. Although the test, as verbalized by the courts, is 
indefinite and therefore cannot provide an absolute basis for decision in 
a given case, reliance upon the factors referred to has made possible 
some consistency. This approach requires the courts to balance one factor 
against another,16 and the cases have shown a tendency of the courts 
to favor the party able to support his position with a preponderance of 
the critical factors. The principal case appears to reach a result contrary 
to that dictated by the application of these criteria. The lessee had the 
right to hire and discharge the station attendants and set their wages 
without consulting the petitioner.17 Even more important, the lessee 
10 E.g., American Broadcasting Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 13 (1957); Albert Lea Co-op. Cream-
ery Ass'n, 119 N.L.R.B. 817 (1957). 
11 American Broadcasting Co., supra note 10, at 18. 
12 Ibid.; Koontz Creamery, Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 1619, 1623 (1953). 
13 See United Ins. Co. of America v. NLRB, 304 F.2d 86, 89 (7th Cir. 1962); National 
Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 273 F.2d 402, 405 (7th Cir. 1960). 
14 National Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, supra note 13, at 405. Another factor which 
may be taken into consideration is the intent of the parties as expressed in their 
contract. However, the court will ignore this when the other factors point strongly to 
a different relationship. 
15 Principal case at 1275. 
16 See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716 (1947). 
17 The lessee also furnished the tools which were used at the station and was 
responsible for the management of the station, although the oil company made sug-
gestions as to the arrangement of displays and like matters. Only tl'l'o factors appear 
to support the result: (1) the oil company computed the station rent with regard to 
sales of gasoline, much like a commission basis; and (2) the gasoline was furnished 
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was not paid a wage by the petitioner, but was compensated by the 
profits he made on the sale of gasoline and other commodities.18 In a 
similar factual setting, the NLRB recently held, in Clark Oil & Refining 
Corp.,10 that such a lessee is an independent contractor. The majority in 
the principal case relegated Clark to a footnote, distinguishing it on its 
facts and seemingly ignoring any similarities between the cases. Instead 
of balancing the various factors for and against the result reached, the 
majority stressed only those particular facts which tended to support its 
conclusion.20 Thus the principal case seems to have broadened the defini-
tion of employee by a subtle but substantial extension of the "right of 
control" test. 
In order to determine the advisability of expanding the employment 
relationship, it is necessary to consider the consequences of such expansion. 
First, the employer may be held responsible for the unfair labor practices 
of his employee.21 Second, once it has been decided that the lessee is an 
employee of the petitioner, the service station attendants are also the 
petitioner's employees.22 A logical extension of this analysis leads to 
the conclusion that the petitioner should be ultimately responsible for the 
attendants' wages, pensions, unemployment benefits, and workmen's com-
pensation. The principal case apparently lends weight to this conclusion. 
The remedy given by the NLRB made the petitioner liable for the back 
wages of the discharged attendants. This at least suggests that the oil 
company may be liable for their wages whenever the lessee defaults. The 
attendants' wages, however, are determined by the contract of employment 
between them and the lessee. This contract may also contain job security 
provisions and many other terms with corresponding responsibilities im-
posed on the employer. If the oil company is to be liable for the attendants' 
wages, it may also be liable for the other benefits secured by the same 
contract. 
on consignment. In fact, the strength of even these factors was diluted by the require-
ment that the lessee pay a substantial sum of money to obtain the lease. 
18 Even though the petitioner set the price at which the lessee could sell, the lessee 
controlled his profit by such factors as the volume he sold, the minimization of his 
overhead, and the wage scale he used to pay his attendants. Furthermore, the lessee 
obtained additional revenue from his sales of items other than the oil company's 
products. 
10 129 N.L.R.B. 750 (1960). 
20 The dissenting member in the principal case pointed out several factors, such 
as the amount of capital necessary to enter the business, which tended to support the 
petitioner's argument that the lessee was an independent contractor. He also stressed 
the fact that the lease in Clark was substantially identical in every important detail 
to the lease in the principal case, the terms of which are set out in note I supra. 
21 NLRA § 2(2), as amended, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1958), includes 
in the definition of employer "any person acting as an agent of an employer" and 
NLRA § 2(13), as amended, 61 Stat. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(13) (1958) provides that a 
person may be an agent even though the specific acts performed were not actually author-
ized. A supervisory employee is considered the employer's agent within the meaning of 
the act. J. D. Jewell, Inc., 99 N.L.R.B. 61 (1952). · 
22 Shell Oil Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 371 (1950). 
130 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
Confronted by the certainty that it will be liable for the unfair labor 
practices of the lessee, together with the possibility that it will be bound 
by all the terms of the attendants' employment contracts, the petitioner 
may well alter its leasing arrangement so as to control this liability. The 
company has two alternatives. It may either increase its influence over 
the lessee to the point where petitioner negotiates with the union for 
the attendants' contracts, or it may relinquish some of its control in the 
hope of avoiding a relationship of employment between it and the lessee. 
I£ the former approach is adopted, the lessee will certainly be no more 
than a supervisory employee. This will effectively destroy what has 
hitherto been one of the largest groups of small businessmen in our 
economy,23 and it flies in the £ace of a concerted effort by Congress, 
through special legislation, to protect the vitality of small business in 
this country.24 On the other hand, if the oil company seeks to redraw 
the lease so as to reduce control over the lessee and thereby render him 
an independent contractor, the company may still destroy service station 
operation as a major small business. This result would follow if the 
company, in trying to make the lessee an independent contractor, decides 
to charge a flat rental for the station instead of one related to sales, or 
ceases to sell its products to the lessee on a consignment basis. Either 
of these steps would greatly increase the financial burdens on the lessee 
and would consequently reduce the number of those able to raise the 
necessary capital. Furthermore, under the principal case the oil company 
cannot be sure exactly how much of, or what aspects of control they 
must give up to satisfy the "right of control" test. 
Although certainty is desirable in this area, the endless variety of 
terms possible in such contracts makes it impossible for the courts or 
Congress to establish an absolute standard to determine whether a person 
is an independent contractor. An approach like that of the principal case, 
however, serves only to promote further uncertainty by departing from 
the existing, albeit indefinite, standards of the prior cases, while phrasing 
the rationale of the decision in terms of those standards. I£ an extension 
of the "employee" concept is desired, it would be far better to enunciate 
new criteria on which to base the determination than to erase the 
boundaries of the established "right of control" test. The most practical 
solution may be for the NLRB to indicate certain provisions it will 
consider compatible with the retention of the independent contractor 
status. At a minimum, this would provide the oil companies with a guar-
anteed method of relieving themselves of liability if they should so desire. 
F. Bruce Kulp, Jr. 
28 AMERICAN PErROLEUM INsrITUTE, PErROLEUM FAcrs AND FIGURES 149 (1961). This 
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